Let’s Get A Tighter Grip On Defence Spending

Britain’s performance on defence procurement is poor – it’s time to make those responsible face the consequences.














Equipped to do the job: British armoured forces in action in Afghanistan.

The history of defence procurement is not a happy one. Ensuring that our Armed Forces get the best possible equipment they need, when they need it, is easier said than done. Today, Labour will publish the findings of a comprehensive 10-month study into defence acquisition policy that will inform a wholesale review of party policy launched by Ed Miliband last year. There are few benefits of being in opposition, but being able to take a step back and reflect is one.

Labour can be proud of the fact that we increased the defence budget by 10 per cent in real terms during our years in power. Defence procurement was reformed and equipment, from drones to personal kit, was transformed – so much so that, by 2009, the last chief of the defence staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, remarked that our troops had never been so well equipped. The welfare of our forces, and crucially that of their families, was also improved.

But defence procurement is a complex and challenging activity. The lead times are enormous and technology changes So what is to be done? It is often said that there is a “conspiracy of optimism” in defence procurement. At best, there is a tendency to muddle through in the hope that both the customer and supplier “get there in the end”. At worst, defence procurement has been based on unrealistic assumptions and over-ambitious plans that balloon beyond all recognition, along with the costs. This conspiracy of optimism has to be replaced by a culture of consequences.

This must apply to the defence industry. In the past, the taxpayer has been left carrying the can for some of its lamentable failings, with some suppliers seeing the UK government as little more than a cash cow. Too many times, once a company or consortia has been awarded a contract, the price begins to ramp up.

First, we need firmer and fairer contracts that incentivise good performance, with industry asked to provide higher warranties for performance. There should be far greater penalties for those that fail to deliver on time and on cost, and the MoD should not be afraid of taking companies back to the initial approval stage, or indeed calling time on contracts that are simply not working. Experience should triumph over hope.

Second, in the case of de facto and actual monopoly suppliers to the MoD, there should be what is known as “open book” contracting once a contract is let. This means far greater transparency of costs and profits in a long-term partnering approach. Within such an approach, there should be not just an agreed price but an agreed target level of profit, too. If the MoD’s requirements change due to operational imperatives – where, say, our Armed Forces need something extra on top of the original specifications – industry must not be allowed to cash in and make super-normal profits on the change in price.

And third, we need shorter, less complex projects with streamlined processes and decision-making. In defence procurement, time is money.

But we also need that same culture of consequences inside the MoD. In the commercial world, promotion and bonuses are based on performance. But in the MoD, there is little sense that poorer performing individuals in very senior roles are ever held accountable. The people leading Integrated Project Teams (IPTs), who manage major procurement programmes, should have the authority, accountability and responsibility for project execution. Currently, they are given as little as four or five days’ training and tend to come from either the Civil Service or from the military – this does not always make them best able to manage hugely challenging commercial contracts.

These problems are compounded by the frequent changes in project managers. The norm in the MoD is to move jobs every two years. This leads to constant changes of strategy and emphasis, which are not helpful and avoid the need for managers to live with the consequences of their actions.

This autumn, the Government will publish its White Paper on the defence industry, but all the signs are that it will have little to say except – as is the case with the Bombardier contract for new trains – that we should give up at home and simply “buy off the shelf” from abroad. Today, Labour will present a host of ideas to reform defence procurement. But in beginning to shape policy for the future, all parties need to be honest about the past and learn from their mistakes.

Michael Dugher MP is shadow minister for defence equipment rapidly, as do our requirements, with the enemy having a say in all of this. And despite all the investment and improvements, we made mistakes. The problems of defence procurement have plagued all governments, but the huge delays and massive cost overruns continued on our watch.

That is why Labour in government commissioned the Gray Report in 2009 to identify the serious failures in acquisition. The current Government liked the report so much that it hired the author, Bernard Gray, to head up defence equipment and support at the Ministry of Defence.

The fact is Britain’s record is poor. Over the period for which there is consistent data (2003-2010), major projects costing the taxpayer in excess of £200 million, and those that were planned to take four to five years between “Main Gate” decision and entry into service, exceeded their most likely out-turn estimate of costs by more than 10 per cent on average – with extremes of up to 40 per cent. These programmes also slipped by 40-50 per cent – some by as much as 250 per cent – from their expected schedule.

So what is to be done? It is often said that there is a “conspiracy of optimism” in defence procurement. At best, there is a tendency to muddle through in the hope that both the customer and supplier “get there in the end”. At worst, defence procurement has been based on unrealistic assumptions and over-ambitious plans that balloon beyond all recognition, along with the costs. This conspiracy of optimism has to be replaced by a culture of consequences.

This must apply to the defence industry. In the past, the taxpayer has been left carrying the can for some of its lamentable failings, with some suppliers seeing the UK government as little more than a cash cow. Too many times, once a company or consortia has been awarded a contract, the price begins to ramp up.

First, we need firmer and fairer contracts that incentivise good performance, with industry asked to provide higher warranties for performance. There should be far greater penalties for those that fail to deliver on time and on cost, and the MoD should not be afraid of taking companies back to the initial approval stage, or indeed calling time on contracts that are simply not working. Experience should triumph over hope.

Second, in the case of de facto and actual monopoly suppliers to the MoD, there should be what is known as “open book” contracting once a contract is let. This means far greater transparency of costs and profits in a long-term partnering approach. Within such an approach, there should be not just an agreed price but an agreed target level of profit, too. If the MoD’s requirements change due to operational imperatives – where, say, our Armed Forces need something extra on top of the original specifications – industry must not be allowed to cash in and make super-normal profits on the change in price.

And third, we need shorter, less complex projects with streamlined processes and decision-making. In defence procurement, time is money.

But we also need that same culture of consequences inside the MoD. In the commercial world, promotion and bonuses are based on performance. But in the MoD, there is little sense that poorer performing individuals in very senior roles are ever held accountable. The people leading Integrated Project Teams (IPTs), who manage major procurement programmes, should have the authority, accountability and responsibility for project execution. Currently, they are given as little as four or five days’ training and tend to come from either the Civil Service or from the military – this does not always make them best able to manage hugely challenging commercial contracts.

These problems are compounded by the frequent changes in project managers. The norm in the MoD is to move jobs every two years. This leads to constant changes of strategy and emphasis, which are not helpful and avoid the need for managers to live with the consequences of their actions.

This autumn, the Government will publish its White Paper on the defence industry, but all the signs are that it will have little to say except – as is the case with the Bombardier contract for new trains – that we should give up at home and simply “buy off the shelf” from abroad. Today, Labour will present a host of ideas to reform defence procurement. But in beginning to shape policy for the future, all parties need to be honest about the past and learn from their mistakes.

Michael Dugher MP is shadow minister for defence equipment.

Could This Be The End Of The RAF? Military Chief Refuses To Rule Out Merger With Navy As Cuts Loom

The future of the RAF and Royal Navy were thrown into doubt last night after the head of the Armed Forces said their merger should be 'debated'.


















Cash-strapped: Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup has not ruled out an amalgamation of the RAF and the Navy.

Sir Jock Stirrup caused consternation when he failed to rule out the amalgamation of two of the three cash-strapped military services.

The Chief of the Defence Staff said it was only 'plausible' that they would all exist separately in ten years' time.

The drastic cuts needed and the growing cooperation between forces in Afghanistan raised the controversial possibility that the air and sea service could unite.

Sir Jock made his comments at the unveiling of the Government's Green Paper on military reform, which lays the groundwork for a full-scale strategic defence review after the General Election.

The document, published by Defence Secretary-Bob Ainsworth, revealed no spending figures nor any indication of how the Armed Forces would look after the long-awaited shake-up. But it was revealed that:

* Defence chiefs will be forced to compromise on purchasing costly state-of-the-art equipment as ministers battle to reduce the nation's £178billion deficit;
* Britain can expect higher casualty rates as we are dragged into guerilla wars with increasingly sophisticated enemies;
* Despite the nation's battered finances, ministers will press ahead with the £20billion update of the Trident nuclear deterrent;
* The Armed Forces will have to work more closely with the French and other allies as spending cuts bite.

Mr Ainsworth also announced that the war in Afghanistan - which has claimed the lives of 253 UK service personnel - remained the top defence priority. Funding for troops and equipment will rise from £3.5billion to £5billion next year.






















And despite the urgent need for the MoD to cut costs in the face of a £ 36billion shortfall, he said that two new aircraft carriers costing £5billion each would 'most likely' go ahead.

The Green Paper warned: 'We cannot proceed with all the activities and programmes we currently aspire to, while simultaneously supporting our current operations and investing in the new capabilities that we need.'

The total number of British service personnel - 188,440 - is dwarfed by that of China and the U.S. and even trails that of France.

The Defence Secretary refused to say where cuts - expected to be significant - would be made in the defence budget.

But Sir Jock admitted that it was 'plausible' that one of the three services could be cut in future.














Top of the list: Afghanistan will remain the priority, with funding set to rise.

He warned against 'duplications, overlap and inefficiencies' in the Army, Royal Navy and RAF, while insisting the three could work seamlessly together. However, he said: 'There are interesting issues to be debated here.'

Experts suggested that the RAF - formed in 1918 - could be most vulnerable to the axe. Its fast jets, transport planes and helicopters could be split between the Army and Navy.


















Mr Ainsworth said he did not foresee 'major structural change' but warned: 'Not allowing single service interests to stand in the way of efficient delivery of security to the nation is something we have to look at.'

He added that the UK must prioritise its defence capabilities because it could not afford to 'insure against every risk'.

He made clear Labour would not scrap the Navy's new aircraft carriers despite criticism they were unaffordable and unsuited to modern conflict.

However, he refused to be drawn on the 140 Joint Strike Fighters intended to fly from the warship. The price of each jet has soared from £37million to more than £62million in four years.

He paved the way for greater military co-operation with France in a 21st century 'Entente Cordiale' while insisting the U.S. would remain Britain's most important ally.

'Our Armed Forces must be prepared if called upon to protect our interests, often in distant places, and most likely as part of a coalition of international forces,' he said.

Mr Ainsworth also promised legislation to force future governments to carry out a strategic defence review every four years. The last was in 1997 soon after Labour entered power.

Tory defence spokesman Liam Fox said: 'That our nation's security should be compromised by Labour's historic economic incompetence is truly a national tragedy.'

Baha Mousa Inquiry: MoD's Guilt For Death Of Army's Iraqi Prisoner

Nineteen soldiers could face criminal charges for their role in the death of an innocent Iraqi man after a public inquiry found he was the victim of “appalling and cowardly” violence while in British custody.












Baha Mousa with his son.

Military and civilian prosecuting authorities are examining the findings of a three-year inquiry into the death of Baha Mousa, a hotel receptionist who died after a 36-hour ordeal at the hands of British soldiers in Basra in September 2003. Nine other civilians were bound, hooded and subjected to “serious, gratuitous violence”.

The inquiry, chaired by Sir William Gage, a retired judge, found the Ministry of Defence guilty of a “corporate failure” to uphold basic standards by allowing rules to go “largely forgotten”. While clearing the soldiers’ unit, the 1st Bn Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, of having an “entrenched culture of violence”, he said it was clear the abuses were not a one-off.

Dr Liam Fox, the Defence Secretary, said the events described in the report were “deplorable, shocking and shameful” and instructed the head of the Army to take action against any serving personnel who were involved.

Three serving soldiers, including an officer, have already been suspended from duty as a result of the inquiry.

Dr Fox told the Commons: “Baha Mousa was not a casualty of war. His death occurred as a detainee in British custody – it was avoidable and preventable and there can be no excuses. There is no place in our Armed Forces for the mistreatment of detainees and there is no place for a perverted sense of loyalty that turns a blind eye to wrongdoing or erects a wall of silence to cover it up.”

The 1,400-page report details how the victims spent a day and a half with bags tied around their heads while being forced to stand in “stress positions” – practices banned under both domestic law and the Geneva Conventions.

Last night the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Peter Wall, said the incident “cast a dark shadow” over the reputation of the Army while David Cameron condemned the “truly shocking and appalling” abuse which he said should never be repeated.

The £13 million inquiry singled out 19 soldiers whom it concluded were directly involved in the abuse, including some who have already faced unsuccessful prosecution at court martial.

Lawyers for families of the victims said there was potentially the evidence to bring new prosecutions against all of them in the civilian courts. It emerged last night that three soldiers serving in the Army, including an officer, had been suspended from duties and MoD sources believed another 11 former servicemen could also face charges.

The suspended officer, Maj Mike Peebles of the Intelligence Corps, would face a second court martial if Army prosecutors believed there was sufficient new evidence. He was originally acquitted of negligently performing a duty during a court martial in 2007 when he was among six soldiers to walk free after the effective collapse of a £20 million case.

Only Cpl Donald Payne, named as committing some of the worst abuses, was convicted at the original court martial after pleading guilty to inhumane treatment. He was cleared of manslaughter but jailed for a year. Six others, including the regiment’s former commanding officer, Col Jorge Mendonça, were cleared of charges.

Yesterday both he and Maj Peebles were singled out as bearing “heavy responsibility” for what happened. Several soldiers who were not involved in the original court martial are among those who could now face prosecution.

This could include a large number of men who have left the Forces.

Dr Fox said efforts were already under way to determine whether “more can be done to bring those responsible to justice”. He told MPs that the MoD’s Iraq Historic Allegations Team had found evidence of “some concern” and cases would be passed to the Director of Service Prosecutions where there was “sufficient” evidence. Any eventual cases would be likely to be brought by the Crown Prosecution Service as most of the men were now civilians. Sapna Malik, a lawyer representing the Iraqi families, said they “expect” both military and civilian prosecuting authorities to act.

Despite the criticism, Dr Fox rejected a key recommendation in the report for a blanket ban on so-called “harsh” questioning methods, warning that lives could be put at risk unless the Forces could deploy all “necessary” techniques.

Army Suspends Baha Mousa Soldiers As More Prosecutions Are Considered

General Sir Peter Wall, the head of the army, says new evidence could mean further disciplinary action against soldiers.












General Sir Peter Wall says further prosecutions against soldiers are being considered after fresh evidence was unearthed.

The army has suspended a number of soldiers after the publication of a damning report into the "violent and cowardly abuse" by servicemen that led to the death of an Iraqi detainee in British military custody.

There have been widespread calls for further prosecutions and the defence secretary, Liam Fox, disclosed that Ministry of Defence inquiries "are revealing evidence of some concern" in other Iraqi abuse cases.

Fox acknowledged for the first time that there could be more prosecutions. "If any serviceman or woman, no matter the colour of uniform they wear, is found to have betrayed the values this country stands for and the standards we hold dear, they will be held to account," he said.

General Sir Peter Wall, head of the army, confirmed that the force's provost martial will investigate whether anyone else should be disciplined in the light of fresh evidence unearthed by Sir William Gage's inquiry into the final hours of Baha Mousa's life in Basra in 2003.

Wall said the inquiry had cast a "dark shadow" over the service's reputation.

The retired appeal court judge's report, which runs to three volumes, found that troops from 1st Battalion Queen's Lancashire Regiment inflicted "gratuitous" violence on a group of 10 Iraqi civilians, who were kicked and hit in turn, "causing them to emit groans and other noises and thereby playing them like musical instruments". This humiliating practice was nicknamed "the choir".

While focusing criticism on a few members of the regiment – particularly Corporal Donald Payne, Lieutenant Craig Rodgers and Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Mendonca – the report also passes scathing comment on the role of the unit's regimental medical officer, Dr Derek Keilloh, and its padre, Father Peter Madden.

Both Keilloh and Madden face further hearings: the doctor will be examined by a General Medical Council disciplinary tribunal over his role in Iraq and the priest is to be interviewed by the archbishop of Birmingham, Bernard Longley.

The report will be passed to prosecutors to assess whether fresh charges should be brought against any soldiers. So far only Payne has been convicted of inhumanely treating civilians; he served one year in prison.

Fox said: "There is no place in our armed forces for the mistreatment of detainees and there is no place for a perverted sense of loyalty that turns a blind eye to wrongdoing or erects a wall of silence to cover it up."

Referring to methods of "conditioning" suspects in Northern Ireland that were banned in 1972, Fox admitted that "there was a 'systemic failure' that allowed knowledge of the prohibition on abusive techniques made by the Heath government to be lost over the years".

Military prosecutors from the Service Prosecuting Authority (SPA) will be responsible for examining any cases brought against those still in uniform. Despite suggestions that the Crown Prosecution Service will be asked to examine the fresh evidence in relation to those who have already left the army, a CPS spokeswoman said: "We are not aware of anything being referred to us."

Dan Leader, a solicitor with Leigh Day and Co, which represented some of the detainees, said: "The claimants are very clear they want accountability. We are talking about torture and murder. All that has happened is that someone has spent one year in prison. The claimants are concerned about criminal justice and feel let down so far."

In terms of immediate disciplinary action, Wall told the Guardian that "some soldiers have been suspended from operational duty and military service". More suspensions may follow. Only 14 of those referred to in the Gage report are still in the army.

So far £2.8m has been paid out by the Ministry of Defence in compensation to Mousa's relatives and the nine other Iraqi detainees held in Basra between 14 and 16 September 2003.

The solicitor Phil Shiner, of Public Interest Lawyers, renewed his call for a wider inquiry into allegations about how British troops treated detainees in southern Iraq between 2003 and 2009.

"There is a case called Ali Zaki Mousa," Shiner said, "currently before the court of appeal that will determine whether the UK should fulfil its legal obligations by holding an extended inquiry into 150 additional complaints by Iraqi civilians."

Mousa's father, Daoud Mousa, was not in Britain for the report's publication but is due to deliver a lecture in memory of his son in London next week.

The MoD signalled that it would not accept one of Gage's recommendations, namely that "harshing" – shouting at detainees to intimidate them – should be abandoned. A test case about the technique, which the MoD defends, is due to come before the courts soon.

The General Medical Council declined to comment on the forthcoming hearing into Keilloh but Peter Jennings, press secretary for the archdiocese of Birmingham, said of the criticism of Madden: "The Catholic church takes this matter extremely seriously.

"The archbishop, the Most Rev Bernard Longley, and the vicar-general of the archdiocese will be meeting with Fr Madden when he has had the opportunity to study carefully the full report and the criticisms of himself in the context of the report."

Amnesty International called for soldiers to be charged.

"Those responsible must be held accountable for their actions and brought swiftly to justice, including in criminal proceedings," said Nicola Duckworth, the organisation's Europe and central Asia director.

Savour Your Moment, Dave. But Don't Get Hooked On War Like Blair

David Cameron once famously scoffed that you don’t impose democracy from 10,000ft up.

But that is just what he — courtesy of NATO bomber jets — has done in Libya.

Having just about won the first foreign conflict he’s been involved in, the Prime Minister is now straining every sinew to avoid triumphalism.


















Tough decisions: Mr Cameron, with troops, shouldn't go the same way as Tony Blair.

There will be no repeat of George Bush’s laughable 2003 made-for-TV assertion of ‘mission accomplished’, even as Iraq descended into post-war chaos.

That is the first of many lessons that Cameron hopes he has learned from that debacle.

To remove a tyrant, as Bush and Tony Blair discovered, is the easy part. It’s reconstructing countries numbed by dictatorship and torn apart by war that’s desperately difficult. Which faction is best suited to rule? What kind of political system should follow? How long should international forces be involved?

These are just a few of the questions facing the foreign leaders.

What Mr Cameron — and his advisers — must be wary about now is that this victory does not give him a taste for other foreign adventures.

Downing Street sources suggest that he spends as much as half of his day on foreign policy, and while it is right that Libya receives due attention, there is a danger in becoming too caught up in events beyond our shores.













Nearing the end? Rebel fighters gesture as they stamp on a part of a statue of Gaddafi inside the main compound in Tripoli.

When, alongside France’s Nicolas Sarkozy, he decided in January to launch air strikes to defend the city of Benghazi, the short-term aims were clear and laudable: to prevent a potential atrocity on the scale of the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in the Nineties.

It was the legacy of the world’s appalling decision to turn away then that spawned the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ — the idea that states should use military force, where necessary, even if that meant flouting the traditional rules of sovereignty.

Blair, a man who had shown precious little interest in foreign affairs before he entered Downing Street soon found himself consumed by the idea that he could police all kinds of problems around the world and burnish his reputation on the international stage in the process.

He ended up fighting four wars in his first five years of office — Operation Desert Fox, during which Iraqi targets were bombed in 1998, Kosovo in 1999, Sierra Leone in 2000, Afghanistan in 2001, and then, fatefully, the war in Iraq in 2003.

It is easy to forget how, before the Iraq imbroglio, Blair was feted wherever he went. One high point was a trip in 1999 to Aachen, a city on Germany’s western border, to receive a prize as the world’s most respected international statesman that year.













Terror over? One of Gaddafi's men is arrested during search for the Libyan leader - but will Cameron take the credit?

The award is named after Charlemagne, the first Western emperor — and it was particularly notable that it had been given to a man who had come to see himself in that role.

Two years later, straight after 9/11, Blair luxuriated in the ovation he received from the American Congress for the support he had offered in America’s darkest hour.

He was rewarded with the unofficial title of Bush’s special emissary, tasked with winning round recalcitrant figures such as Vladimir Putin of Russia and General Pervez Musharraf to supporting Bush’s invasion of Afghanistan, and the ‘war on terror’. At that point, Blair was in his element and succeeded in securing a broad alliance for these ventures.

He believed that the UK’s place in the world was defined by our proximity to whatever administration was in office in Washington. This was standard Whitehall practice, but Blair took it to a logical extreme.

Cameron is working in a somewhat different environment. Bush, the ‘toxic Texan’, is long gone. Barack Obama has shown a studied reluctance to become the world’s policeman-in-chief, knowing that fighting global battles no longer goes down well on Main Street U.S.

His support on Libya was cursory. In spite of the effusive words during his summer visit to London — and the perfect picture opportunity of the barbecue for service personnel on the Number 10 lawn — Obama no longer regards the British premier as the first button to press on his speed dial.


















Agreement: French President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister David Cameron agreed to back intervention in Libya.

What little attention he does pay to foreign affairs, he has concentrated on the economic threat posed by China. It is not just the diplomatic landscape that has changed when it comes to committing British forces abroad. So have the economics.

While administering 8 per cent cuts to the defence budget, Cameron has found himself involved in two major conflicts: Libya and Afghanistan.

A recent House of Commons Defence Select Committee report pointed out glaring inconsistencies — ones that should cause any premier with a growing fascination with foreign adventures to pause for thought.

How, it asked, could the PM preside over a sudden intervention in Libya and a continued engagement of attrition in Afghanistan while cutting back the armed forces?

‘We are not convinced, given the financial climate and the drawdown of capabilities arising from the Strategic Defence and Security Review, that from 2015 the Armed Forces will maintain the capability to undertake all that is being asked of them,’ the MPs noted.

As for Cameron’s claim that the UK retains ‘full spectrum defence capability’ — that he could fight the good fight wherever he wanted — the committee was caustic: ‘We can only conclude that the Government has postponed the sensible aspiration of bringing commitments and resources into line.’ In other words, get real.

Cameron seems to have learned half the lessons of the Iraq debacle. Certainly, he was keen to avoid the duplicity and machinations of Blair and his ministerial team (although coalition ministers have been worryingly reluctant to divulge the costs of the NATO campaign in Libya).

Thus was Cameron was eager to secure the support of the UN, which approved the aim of saving Benghazi (but not the add-on of removing Gaddafi).















Dogs of war: It is hoped Cameron doesn't get as 'hooked' on war as Tony Blair and George Bush were.

Now, Libya is on the verge of erupting in celebration at the fall of the tyrant, at which point and Cameron and Sarkozy will discreetly give themselves a pat on the back. It will be worth celebrating the removal of one more despot. But many of the questions that dog interventions such as these will remain unresolved.

Blair fell in love with his own image on the international stage. It was so much more enjoyable than trying to reform recalcitrant public services, not to mention the myriad other squabbles and deal-making that make up the tedious slog of domestic politics.

During his wars, the hero worship from a small town in Germany to the U.S. went to his head. He then fell to earth with Iraq, his reputation in tatters. Cameron, as is so often said, believes himself to be the heir to Blair.

His aides have studied the speeches and read the books.

But having made a good fight of the North African venture, the Prime Minister would do well to keep his confidence in check, and to work doggedly for a coherent reconstruction of Libya.

And all the while, he would be wise to remember that ultimately prime ministers are re-elected — or not — on their performance in domestic affairs.

A Britain still recovering from the riots and in the throes of economic malaise is in need of all the care and attention that some premiers prefer to expend on countries thousands of miles from Downing Street.

Cameron Still Lacks A Foreign Policy Vision

What kind of a power do we want to be? How do we achieve that ambition? Cameron is unsure.












David Cameron greets troops after making a speech to British and American troops at Camp Leatherneck military base on July 4, 2011 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Nato's mission in Libya looks like a foreign policy success for David Cameron, but that is not the same thing as having a successful foreign policy.

First, the obvious caveats: it is early days; the battle is not over, let alone the war. There are easily enough military and diplomatic traps ahead for the Libyan intervention to become a failure. The prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the foreign secretary and the defence secretary have all said as much. But for now, the politics of the situation are favouring Cameron. He took a big decision under considerable pressure and, after some nerve-wracking months, it appears to have paid off. "He definitely leapt before he looked," was how one senior Ministry of Defence official put it too me early on in the campaign. (The same source also said of the anti-Gaddafi rebels "the only good fighters among them are the al-Qaeda ones", a slightly wild allegation which should nonetheless be reason enough to put blind optimism for the future on hold.)

Libyans will decide whether they are better off in the long run for the UK's military partisanship in their insurrection-cum-civil war. The point is that, in the eyes of the British public, Cameron has effectively led a short war. There are usually political dividends to be drawn from that position.

But I suspect they will be limited in this case because, as with so much of Cameron's leadership, the good news story doesn't slot into a wider strategic narrative. It is worth remembering that the Conservatives came into power signalling reluctance to reshape the world - a la Blair - by military excursion. The new doctrine, as spelled out by William Hague in a series of speeches in July 2010, was a kind of bilateral mercantilism. The UK would continue to promote freedom and democracy around the globe, the foreign secretary said, but the main tool would be aggressive pursuit of trade interests. Overseas embassies would be reconfigured as pushy chambers of commerce.

Barely weeks before taking action in Libya, Cameron declared: "I am not a naive neocon who thinks you can drop democracy out of an aeroplane at 40,000ft." The fact that Cameron then decided to use British military assets against Gaddafi doesn't signal some visionary conversion to fanatical interventionism. Libya might be a one-off; Gaddafi might just have been low-hanging despotic fruit.

To get the maximum political advantage from the intervention, Cameron has to frame the episode in terms of his vision of Britain's role in the world - and it isn't clear that he has one. The project of expanding our national influence by trade is looking trickier as the global economy falters. As an ambition it is of a pair with George Osborne's hope of rebalancing the economy and driving growth through exports - which relies on a level of overseas demand for UK goods that has not yet materialised.

A big gap in Cameron's world view (at least the publicly known portion of it) is his sense of how Britain's position in the European Union will evolve as the single currency lurches ever onward in financial and institutional crisis. As I mentioned in my column this week, this omission is stirring dissent in the party. A lot of Tories see the eurozone crisis as an opportunity to start a wholesale renegotiation of Britain's EU deal, but there isn't much appetite for that at the top of the party. (This is partly because the leadership's view of all matters EU is coloured by their "modernising" crusade in opposition, so there is an association between public expressions of fierce euroscepticism and unelectability. Then, of course, there is the problem of the stubbornly Europhile Lib Dems.)

The Arab Spring; global economic turbulence; structural crisis at the heart of the European Union - three giant themes that raise profound questions about Britain's position in the world. What kind of a power do we want to be? How do we achieve that ambition? I don't get the impression that Cameron is any closer to having persuasive answers to those questions than he was when he moved into Downing Street last year.

British Army Faces Further Inquiries Into Alleged Abuse Of Iraqi Prisoners

Other torture allegations remain to be heard after army cleared of systemic abuse in Baha Mousa case.












The British army faces further inquiries into its treatment of prisoners in Iraq. Above, Al-Ma'aqal prison in Basra, 2004.

The Baha Mousa report is not the only one to look into the question of the "systemic" abuse of Iraqi prisoners.

A second inquiry is to open later this year, examining disputed allegations that up to 20 men were tortured and murdered in British custody after a gun battle in southern Iraq in 2004.

That inquiry became inevitable after the high court severely criticised the Royal Military Police's investigation into the affair and said that courts should be wary of evidence given by the RMP's second in command.

The court of appeal is currently considering whether to order a third inquiry, into the military's entire detention and interrogation policy, after hearing arguments on behalf of more than 150 men who allege they were systematically tortured by the British army in south-east Iraq between 2003 and 2008.

The complaints include 59 allegations of detainees being hooded, 11 of electric shocks, 122 of sound deprivation through the use of ear muffs, 52 of sleep deprivation, 131 of sight deprivation using blackened goggles, 39 of enforced nakedness and 18 of being kept awake by pornographic DVDs played on laptops.

The Ministry of Defence's lawyers have conceded that the individual allegations "raise an arguable case of breach of Article 3" of the European convention on human rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. But, in its attempts to persuade the courts that a third inquiry is not needed, the MoD has set up a team of 80 investigators, half of them former civilian detectives, to examine the allegations.

The Iraq historic allegations team (Ihat) is now scouring MoD records, including hundreds of video recordings of military interrogations, and interviewing the complainants.

Many of the complaints centre on a secretive Intelligence Corps facility known as the joint forces interrogation team, or JFIT. Already, three men who served at the JFIT have been referred to the director of service prosecutions, who has been asked to consider war crimes charges under the 2001 International Criminal Court Act.

Nine other deaths in British military custody are also being re-examined.

David Cameron Insists Huge Armed Forces Cut Is Modernisation

David Cameron has defended the decision to make 11,000 redundancies in the UK armed forces — potentially including some troops now on the frontline in Afghanistan.

The Prime Minister conceded that axing around 5,000 personnel from the Army, 3,300 from |the Navy and 2,700 from the |RAF would be “difficult” for those affected.













But he insisted the losses were necessary to “modernise and update” Britain's forces for future challenges.

Labour criticised the Government for announcing details of the cuts at the same time Mr Cameron has been suggesting the RAF could help enforce a no-fly zone over Libya.

Last autumn's Strategic Defence and Security Review set out plans for reducing the size of the Armed Forces by 17,000 in total.

Some of that number will be met by not replacing people who were retiring or leaving for other reasons.

But defence officials disclosed that 11,000 personnel still face being made redundant on a compulsory or voluntary basis.

Commodore Jonathan Woodcock told a briefing for journalists that the first tranche would be notified whether they were being made redundant in September.

No-one serving in Afghanistan at that time will be eligible to lose their jobs, but virtually all personnel currently serving in the country could be included, he said.

The reductions are due to be fully achieved by April 2015.

The Ministry of Defence stressed the changes would have “no impact on current operations”.













In the wake of media leaks that trainee pilots were being laid off, and the accidental sacking of soldiers serving in Afghanistan by email, Defence Secretary Liam Fox also promised that reductions would be handled with “sensitivity and care”.

No-one who is deployed on operations, preparing to deploy on operations, or recently returned from operations will be considered for redundancy unless they volunteer. Those recovering from injury will also be exempt.

However, Commodore |Woodcock confirmed that personnel currently serving in Afghanistan would be eligible, as almost all will have completed their tour by September.

Shadow defence secretary Jim Murphy said: “This is incredible. At the same time as planning a no-fly zone over Libya the Tory-led Government chooses today of all days to sack RAF personnel. The pilots will be stunned and the country will be confused.

“These are the very same people who would help enforce no-fly zones. The Government is losing its way on defence.”

However, Mr Cameron laid the blame on mismanagement by the former Labour Government.

“These were incredibly difficult decisions, but we had an inheritance of a defence budget that was overspent by £38bn and where decisions had been put off and put off and we were not modernising and updating our armed forces so they were able to cope with the modern challenges they were going to have to meet,” he said.

“We did not take any of these decisions lightly.”

Cameron Vents His Frustration At Military Commanders - Again

The Prime Minister said that he wished they would stick to fighting - and leave him to do the talking

Downing Street's evident irritation at the way senior military commanders keep speaking their mind, rather than parroting the party line from No10, became more pronounced today at a press briefing.













David Cameron said:

"There are moments when I wake up and read the newspapers and think: 'I tell you what, you do the fighting and I'll do the talking'."

Quite. This has had defence officials guffawing all over Whitehall.

Cameron spoke out after the Daily Telegraph was leaked a briefing paper from Air Chief Marshall Sir Simon Bryant, which said that the service was "running hot" and that it would struggle to meet any extra challenges if the Libya operation continued beyond the summer.

He also said that morale in the RAF was very low. It probably plunged a little further over the weekend, when its officers read the report in the Sunday Times that suggested Downing Street was considering proposals to slash the RAF by even more than the 5,000 personnel set out in last year's Strategic Defence and Security Review.

No wonder someone thought of leaking Sir Simon's private thoughts. The First Sea Lord Sir Mark Stanhope made similar remarks last week.

The problem for Cameron is that, however much he sticks his fingers in his ears, there is genuine anxiety within the armed forces about the government's commitment to the military, and how they re expected to cope in the near future.

The Prime Minister is right to say that the Libya operation can continue indefinitely. But Stanhope and Bryant are also right to point out that something else will have to give in the longterm.

And so the argument goes round and round...

The defence select committee will have a chance to get to nub of the problem tomorrow afternoon when General Sir David Richards, chief of the Defence staff, and the Armed Forces minister Nick Harvey, are quizzed by MPs.